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Abstract: Economic geography and regional planning suffer 
from a lack of clear answers with respect to the question 
what methods to use to systematically explain complex ter-
ritorial phenomena such as regional development. Rather 
than the universal effect of causes, analysis should focus 
on patterns revealed through case-specific effects of ena-
bling and disabling conditions. Using qualitative configura-
tional analysis (QCA), this paper illustrates the relevance of 
such an approach examining the variable effectiveness of 
intermunicipal collaboration in the Netherlands. Drawing 
on a survey of a large sample of collaborations, comple-
mented with case-specific inside knowledge, eight con-
ditions are found supporting collaboration effectiveness: 
age, size, homogeneity, project/policy activity, mission 
and inclusiveness. The configurational analysis uncovers 
one dominant evolutionary pattern (evolving policy focus), 
one minor pattern (metropolitan collaboration) plus two 
somewhat unique cases. It also finds contributing roles for 
mission-orientation, inclusiveness, and, somewhat surpris-
ingly, size. QCA proves a promising tool to study complex 
dynamics across a population of territorial cases.
Introduction
Rather than single linear explanations or pathways, 
regional development tends to follow multiple complex 
patterns. Moreover, complex spatial phenomena, such as 
territorial collaboration, depend primarily on indigenous 
dynamics and self-organisation in which an important 
part of causality is best captured in terms of enabling/
disabling conditions. Hence, instead of probing the effect 
of success factors, as universal causes, analysis should 
focus on the case-specific effect of conditions as causes, 
and examine which more general patterns transpire from 
examining multiple cases. A suitable method for this is 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). QCA overcomes 
the limitations of traditional statistical techniques, such 
as poor qualification of effect sizes, applying unifinality 
and the danger of ecological fallacy (Rutten, 2019). QCA, 
in turn, embraces a contextual logic based on the princi-
ple of equifinality, both where it concerns the ‘enablers’ 
(there is more than one route to success) and outcomes 
(similar routes may lead to different destinations). Until 
now QCA has not been abundantly used in the field of eco-
nomic geography. Some notable exceptions are provided 
by Rutten (2019, 2020), discussing the role of openness in 
regional innovation and Li & Bathelt (2019) on successful 
knowledge strategies across space. As we seek to illus-
trate here, QCA presents a fruitful approach to undertake 
regional socio-economic and policy research.
Establishing regional collaboration is seen as a strat-
egy to achieve efficiency gains in the provision of public 
services, improving political clout and improving eco-
nomic strength by aligning local investments and activ-
ities (Hospers & Beugelsdijk, 2000; Miller & Lee, 2009). 
The major drivers of collaboration are collective service 
provision, efficiency, and increasing importance of ‘place-
based (socio)economic development and branding’ 
(Geertsema, 2017; Grindle, 2004; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; 
VROM et al., 2009). In their discussion of interjurisdic-
tional collaboration across the US, Nunn and Rosentraub 
(1997) also present the motive of (re)distribution between 
more and less wealthy areas. The latter does not play a role 
in countries such as The Netherlands, where municipali-
ties receive most income from national budgets. Neverthe-
less, while practical motives of mutual gain and efficiency 
prevail, and supporting conditions are present, establish-
ing and maintaining effective collaboration is not easy. In 
practice, research has shown that only about half of all 
Dutch collaborations are successful (Duysters et al., 2012; 
Hospers, 2012). Besides illustrating the power of QCA, 
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understanding this modest success presents the focus of 
this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. A review of theory 
on collaboration serves to sketch a broad spectrum of 
conditions. This is followed by an explanation of the con-
figurational method (QCA) and data collection, and by a 
presentation of findings and conclusion.
Conditions of intermunicipal 
collaboration
In the Netherlands, intermunicipal collaboration has a 
long history. Since 1851, when the first law on municipal 
collaboration was established, municipalities have joined 
forces and resources in specific areas such as mobility, 
spatial planning (housing, business estates) and envi-
ronment (waste, water). In recent decades, devolution in 
welfare and care provision from national and provincial to 
municipal level has induced further collaboration. Since 
1950, collaboration is formally arranged through the Law 
on Common Provisions (Wet Gemeenschappelijke Rege-
lingen, WGR), revised many times since. Currently, three 
developments stand out. First, due to increased admin-
istrative and competitive pressures, municipalities either 
choose to merge or to enhance collaboration notably in the 
field of common service provision and/or economic profil-
ing and strategy-making (e.  g. through establishing Eco-
nomic Boards). It should be said that merger has always 
been a strong alternative to collaboration, resulting in a 
decline of the number of municipalities from almost 1200 
in the early 1900  s to 355 in 2019. Second, also in light of 
the broadening spectrum of collaboration (from services 
to economic strategies), a broader variation of institu-
tional arrangements is used for intermunicipal collabora-
tion besides the WGR. This is part of a constant search for 
new variations in the nature, scale, establishment, organ-
isation and performances of inter-municipal collabora-
tions (Hes & Van Sabee, 2015; Johnston & Acharya, 2007). 
Third, there is increasing concern about the effectiveness 
of collaboration, also in light of mounting (cost) pressures 
on municipalities. Despite the long-standing institutional-
isation and experience with collaborations, municipalities 
and other stakeholders find it hard to work together. This 
raises the question of how effective collaboration can be 
established.
Which conditions play a role in turning intermunic-
ipal collaboration more or less successful? What com-
monalities and variations can we see in the achievement 
of successful collaboration versus failures? This section 
will revisit the literature on collaboration, starting from 
the broad view that collaboration embraces three broad 
dimensions, namely political, institutional and social-cul-
tural. In turn, these dimensions are each synthetically 
covered by three perspectives, namely institutional collec-
tive action theory, collaborative governance and regional 
regimes (Kuijpers, 2017). Our review, accordingly, leads to 
a conceptual matrix of three perspectives shedding light 
on three aspects of collaboration (Table 1).
The three perspective are as follows. First, collec-
tive action theory adopts a primarily instrumentalist 
approach, with a focus on the distribution of costs and 
benefits between collaboration partners, focusing on the 
long-term (Boogers, 2013; Feiock, 2009, 2013; Nicholls, 
2005; Olson, 1971; Van den Berg et al., 2002). It sees col-
laboration in terms of a deal in which costs are shared to 
create and distribute benefits among the partners. Such 
a deal is well anchored in institutional-legal frameworks, 
based on a certain homogeneity in the scope, power and 
resources and a fitting level of mutual trust. Second, col-
laborative governance theory features the role of organi-
sational-cultural conditions of ‘stakeholders’ in the way a 
collaborative arrangement functions as a social arrange-
ment (Emerson et al., 2015). To do so, members should 
manifest a certain equality in their stakes and resources 
for collaborating, and the network should possess ade-
quate levels of binding leadership, ways of trust-creation 
and conflict regulation. Finally, drawing on urban regime 
theories, regional regime theory addresses the way collab-
oration yields, and is sustained by, a political coalition of 
interests, resources and a shared spatial-economic agenda 
(Boogers, 2013; Hamilton, 2004; Stone, 1989). The impetus 
for collaboration stems from commitment going beyond 
formal administrative motives, and captures the transi-
tion from ‘managerial’ to more ‘entrepreneurial’ forms of 
territorial governance (Harvey, 1989). Regimes derive their 
strength, in particular, from the input and quality of stake-
holders acting as civic ‘leaders’ or ‘policy entrepreneurs’, 
and the umbrella organisations channelling their views 
and interests (Keating, 1998).
Turning to the dimensions, political conditions encom-
pass the grounds and logics for choosing a particular form 
and scope for collaboration, the creation of political alli-
ances and leadership, and the advocacy for intermunici-
pal collaboration from the wider political economy of the 
region. Three core factors stand out, namely ‘value prop-
ositions’, political motivation and the sense of urgency. 
First, for all municipal partners, collaboration, as a form 
of collective action, must present explicit and convincing 
‘value propositions’, based on realistic and achievable 
aims (Von Malmborg, 2003). Collaborations manifest, in 
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general, a strong instrumentality, rooting collaboration 
in calculative logics of costs and benefits at partner level. 
Just solidarity based on benefits accruing to the region as 
a whole presents insufficient motive for partners to join 
or stay on. Such instrumentality, however, exceeds the 
economic-financial domain. Value refers here to the broad 
range of societal-spatial issues for which municipalities 
are responsible. Second, how these values are pursued 
depends on the role of motivational factors, power and 
leadership in forging processes of communication, deci-
sion-making and implementation, topics generally dis-
cussed under the header of collaborative governance 
theory (Ansell & Gash, 2012; Boogers, 2013; Boogers et al., 
2016; Van den Berg et al., 2002). Third, a key motivational 
trigger is the way prominent leaders and organisations 
shape a certain sense of urgency prompting collaboration. 
The sense of urgency fuels the more formal steps towards 
collaboration, as well as the more concrete collaborative 
policy processes and measures (Hamilton, 2004). An 
important aspect of the sense of urgency is a broad aware-
ness of individual actors that they do not have the ability 
to solve core regional problems on their own, so that col-
laboration is imperative (Von Malmborg, 2003). An overar-
ching dimension, finally, is the political-economic setting 
of the intermunicipal arena, in which political motive and 
drive are rooted (as discussed in Regime Theory). This 
setting includes the views and interest of leaders and rep-
resentatives of business, non-state organisations (science, 
education, utilities, etc.) and civil society, from the ‘cap-
tains of industry’ to the transition advocates of NGOs (Van 
de Laar, 2010).
Institutional conditions refer to the way interaction 
is structured and performing. For collective action, this 
warrants a well-structured governance framework, with 
clear (limited) membership and a fitting legal framework 
(Olson, 1971). Such a framework does not only entail deci-
sion-making on policy focus and design, but also the way 
implementation and activities are coordinated. Collab-
orative governance adds to this framework the grounds 
and skills for negotiation, including the competencies 
for organising the decision-making and communication 
processes and the mechanisms of conflict resolution. 
Moreover, at a more informal level and intersecting with 
social-cultural conditions, the evolution of mutual con-
ventions (‘accepted ways of working together’) and mutual 
trust is important. Trust generally manifests a high level 
of recursivity. That is, mediated by the interdependency 
between stakeholders and the voluntariness of a collab-
oration, trust is fuelled by tangible success of the collab-
oration (Ansell & Gash, 2012). Extending the institutional 
roots beyond the formal boundaries of the municipal state, 
finally, three conditions come into play:
– the strengths of regional networks, notably their insti-
tutional capacity to channel issues and fuel senses of 
need and urgency; strong regional networks heavily 
depend on the willingness to act together, flexibility 
and trust (Van den Berg et al., 2002) and can be char-
acterised by organisational features as homogeneity 
and scope (Boogers, 2013);
– possibilities for negotiation outside the formal meet-
ings of the collaboration, involving other leading 
figures and representatives from the region;
– a liaison or even fusion of the state-only intermu-
nicipal collaboration with a wider regional umbrella 
organisation, such as a Triple Helix configuration (for 
instance in the form of an ‘Economic Board’).
Table 1: Conditions supporting intermunicipal collaboration 
Theory Aspects Collective Action Collaborative Governance Regional Regimes
Political –  Scope and focus8
–  Possibilities to distribute the costs & 
benefits among the partners*
–  Binding leadership*
–  Equal power positions of partners10
–  Need to collaborate*
–  Regional sense of urgency, advocacy9
–  Non-governmental leaders5
Institutional –  Formal governance & implemen-
tation2,6
–  Consistency of legal framework
–  Shared ground of expectations & 
trust3
–  Conflict regulating mechanisms4
–  Shared conventions & mutual trust3
–  Quality & transparency of decision 
making*
–  Strong (socio-economic) regional 
networks; regional umbrella 
organisation5
–  Room for informal meetings*
Social- cultural –  Homogenous population structure3
–  Regional social unity*
–  Bonding between partners1
–  Regional solidarity*
–  Wide social commitment7
–  Quality of stakeholders’ contacts and 
networks*
For reference numbers see conditions in table 4
* – not directly covered by conditions used in the analysis
Source: own elaboration
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Social-cultural conditions primarily play an enabling 
role. Issues like shared regional identities, solidarity and 
mutual understanding can certainly lubricate the forma-
tion of a collaboration and its actual performance, but do 
not commonly play a decisive role. That is because inter-
municipal collaboration is primarily about creating shared 
benefits, not about the establishment of political-cultural 
regions. Nevertheless, within the environment of the col-
laboration, what may help is a certain homogeneity in 
population structures and the perception of social unity. 
Also helpful are a good fabric of interpersonal contacts 
and networking amongst stakeholders (Hes & Van Sabee, 
2015), and a wide social commitment to doing things 
together, as part of deeper regional anchoring. Within the 
setting of the collaboration, social bonding and solidarity 
play important enabling roles (Paasi, 1986).
The elements listed in Table 1 should not be seen as 
exerting determinate effects, but as conditions that in 
different combinations may (dis)serve to the way stake-
holders collaborate. Because of its intricate and complex 
nature, intermunicipal collaboration is a phenomenon 
in which, to quote Nunn and Rosentraub (1997, p. 217), 
“different tactics and approaches may achieve similar 
outcomes”. Hence, collaboration is rooted in differ-
ent combinations of conditions, enabling agency and 
resources contributing to more or less effectiveness. They 
do so in complex ways. The same condition may con-
tribute to opposite outcomes (effective vs less-effective) 
in conjunctions with other conditions, while the same 
outcome may be supported by different configurations 
(equifinality).
To deal with such causal complexity and equifinal-
ity, this paper draws on Qualitative Comparative Analy-
sis (Marx et al., 2014; Ragin et al., 2003). QCA’s key aim 
is to reveal necessary and sufficient conditions for an 
outcome, bundling cases in configurational sets underpin-
ning certain ‘recipes’ or ‘paths’ or, as called here, ‘types 
of collaboration’. More technically, configurations present 
sets of cases marked by the presence and/or absence of 
certain conditions yielding one outcome. For these con-
figurations, the conditions are called ‘INUS-conditions’, 
single conditions being insufficient but necessary parts of 
a compound configuration which is itself unnecessary but 
sufficient for the outcome. The application of INUS-condi-
tions enables systematic and robust interpretations based 
on equifinality (multiple paths towards one outcome) 
and in which conditions explain in contingent and com-
binatory manners. Importantly, and unlike regression 
analysis, QCA’s path (or pattern) recognition occurs bot-
tom-up, through reducing the number of configurations 
needed to explain the outcomes for all cases. In doing so, 
QCA helps to “gather in-depth insight into the different 
cases and capture their complexity, while still attempt-
ing to produce some level of generalization” (Marx et al., 
2014, p. 129).
The bottom-up processes adopted here consists of 
a two-step empirical procedure. The first step entails a 
primary pre-screening of the total corpus of cases with 
the help of a broader set of conditions. On the basis of the 
pre-screening results, the second step narrows down both 
the corpus and list of conditions, thus constituting the 
final corpus and set of conditions for the configurational 
analysis.
Measuring effectiveness and its 
conditions
How do we define effectiveness? As Nunn and Rosentraub 
(1997, p. 208) argue, the success of collaboration strongly 
depends on local contexts and ambitions: “measuring the 
outcomes of interjurisdictional cooperation must be based 
on knowledge of the original objectives of each region’s 
attempt at cooperation, and not be driven (…) by some 
set of preconceived notions about what is and is not good 
cooperation”. The analysis here thus adopts an instru-
mental approach to the characterisation of effectiveness 
and its conditions. Effectiveness is defined as reaching, on 
balance, a positive benefit for the partners involved. Theo-
retically, effectiveness entails the extent to which a region 
succeeds in translating self-determined collective interests 
into concrete initiatives by using a regional cooperation 
structure (Levelt et al., 2012). In more practice terms, a 
collaboration is experienced as effective and well-func-
tioning when a situation is created in which the benefits 
for a region do outweigh the perceived costs of a cooper-
ation (Feiock, 2013; Lowery, 2000). Costs and benefits go 
beyond financial and economic surpluses. Financial costs 
concern the fees of municipalities and inhabitants of a 
region to achieve objectives; yet these weigh less (in terms 
of amounts) than non-financial or collaboration costs.
Boogers et al. (2016) distinguish five types of collab-
oration costs, namely information, coordination, nego-
tiations, compliance and representation costs and four 
types of collaboration benefits. First, information costs are 
incurred by the need to obtain insights into the resources 
and objectives of all stakeholders. Second, coordination 
costs stem from the adaption of various policies of munic-
ipalities and other organisations to the specific nature of 
a region. Third, negotiation costs are needed to achieve 
consensus regarding the content and form and distribu-
Arnoud Lagendijk, Martin van der Velde, Mark Kuijpers: Looking for causes of effects in cases   153
tion of costs and benefits. Fourth, compliance costs orig-
inate from efforts to control stakeholders concerning the 
appointments made and their contribution to intermunic-
ipal collaboration. Fifth, representation costs cover the 
meetings and discussions with boards of municipalities 
and other stakeholders. Opposite these costs, Boogers dis-
tinguishes between the following types of benefits:
– Strategic benefits: the tackling of regional objectives 
and social issues;
– Tactical benefits: the development of regional effec-
tive policies;
– Operational benefits: efficiency and mass in involving;
– Economic benefits: impact on gross regional product.
In our configurational analysis, outcome is based on the 
overall balance of costs and benefits. A positive surplus is 
associated with effectiveness; a negative surplus indicates 
less-effectiveness.
How do we select conditions? To limit the number of 
possible configurations, QCA is commonly executed with 
5–8 conditions (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009). In view of the 
encompassing exploration of possible conditions (Table 
1), our pre-screening started with a broader inventory. 
Subsequently, the relevance, calculability and availability 
of optional conditions have been discussed in detail with 
experts in the field (as part of an internship by one of the 
authors). This has resulted in a selection of 10 conditions, 
covering a large part of the spectrum covered by Table 1. 
We recognise that finding good and doable conditions is a 
difficult task which always leaves certain aspects wanting. 
In the final selection, every cell is covered by at least one 
condition, with some more emphasis on institutional and 
political conditions than on socio-cultural conditions. The 
conditions are:
1. Age [YOF]
Many aspects of collaboration evolve through time 
(Boogers, 2013). This includes the creation of mutual 
understanding, solidarity, trust and commitment, the 
creation of effective means of informal and formal com-
munication, and the development of shared governance 
and decision-making structures. A basic expectation 
thus is that intermunicipal collaborations learn how to 
be more effective over time by gaining maturity (Boogers, 
2013; Bremekamp, 2014; Hes & Van Sabee, 2015). However, 
age may also erode effectiveness. The sense of urgency 
prompting the initial steps towards collaboration may 
evaporate. Feelings of solidarity and commitment may be 
tempered by competing interests or mounting irritation. 
Trust may be broken due to negative experiences. Collabo-
rations may also become subject to institutional sclerosis. 
Accordingly, how effectiveness changes through time, if at 
all, may vary.
2. Size: number of partners [NOP]
A second condition of effective collaboration is the number 
of participating municipalities. A general expectation is 
that homogeneity in scope, power and resources, the build-
ing of a consistent network, informal communication and 
solidarity all stand to benefit from a smaller group. So a first 
expectation is that it is easier for smaller collaborations to 
be more effective than larger ones (Boogers, 2013; Boogers 
et al., 2016). There are also counterarguments, however. 
A larger network may benefit from scale economies, have 
more political clout, and hence muster more resources 
from local, provincial and national levels. There are more 
possibilities for distributing costs and benefits amongst a 
large group of partners. Larger groups may also be better 
able to regulate and stem conflicts, because it is more diffi-
cult for one or two partners to overpower the network. So, 
like time, size may work both ways, or not work at all, and 
depend strongly on specific issues and challenges.
3. Group homogeneity [HOM]
A closely related condition is the homogeneity amongst 
the partners in population size (the extent to which part-
ners have comparable numbers of inhabitants. The basic 
expectation here is that collaborative structures manifest-
ing more homogeneity are more effective (Boogers, 2013). 
The main reasons for this are threefold:
– equal power positions,
– the operation of governance structures (including 
conflict regulation) and leadership at a distance of the 
individual partners, and
– the creation of balanced mutual trust.
Opposite mechanisms could also be at work, however. 
A large core municipality surrounded by several smaller 
(suburban) ones may benefit from the sense of urgency 
stemming from typical metropolitan issues such as con-
gestion, land shortage for housing and business estates, 
environmental problems, etc. Such an ‘unequal’ collabo-
ration may also benefit from the resources and political 
clout of the dominant municipality.
4. WGR formalisation [WGR]
Three conditions deal with coordination aspects, covering 
formalisation, involvement of regional stakeholders and 
coordination. On the first aspect, intermunicipal collabo-
ration warrants an agreement stipulating the identity and 
role of the parties, its overall scope and specific domains, 
and its procedures of communication and decision-mak-
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ing. This is provided by the legal framework on inter-
municipal collaboration, the ‘Wet Gemeenschappelijke 
Regelingen’ (WGR). The expectation here is that the effec-
tiveness of intermunicipal collaborations benefits from 
the formal structure of a regional cooperation (Hamilton, 
2004; Hes & Van Sabee, 2015). Formal anchoring is a signal 
of commitment and helps to fix the basic terms and expec-
tations of the collaboration. Theoretically, it could limit 
flexibility, although municipalities always have the possi-
bility to extend or change the scope of their joint activities 
in an informal way, followed by adaptation of the formal 
contract. A negative impact therefore seems remote. What 
is less remote is that WGR has no impact. Although the 
‘WGR’ legal framework prescribes strong collaboration 
agreements with many obligations, this can also be met 
by other legal frameworks (creating a foundation, using 
a variety of management agreements, etc). Also given the 
widespread use of other frameworks, it is an open ques-
tion whether WGR makes a noticeable difference.
5. Involvement of business and education: Triple Helix [TH]
Besides providing for horizontal ties between municipali-
ties, collaboration may also entail lateral ties with organi-
sations from business and knowledge domains. This gen-
erally occurs through the establishment of a ‘Triple Helix’ 
umbrella organisation, in which decision-making on 
regional development is taken by a collective of municipal-
ities and stakeholders from business, science and educa-
tion. Sometimes also civil society (NGOs, CSOs) is involved 
as a fourth domain, giving rise to a so-called ‘Quadruple 
Helix’. Such lateral engagements can be expected to bolster 
collaboration, making it better supported and hence effec-
tive (Boogers, 2013; Hamilton, 2004). Market, education 
and civil society parties may yield insights, support and 
resources for a wide variety of strategy developments and 
service provisions. Through their broader basis, Triple 
Helix structures also make it easier for leading figure from 
business, education and society to express their views on 
current states and future direction of a region. This facili-
tates a role for so-called ‘policy entrepreneurs’ striving for 
transitions (mobility, energy, housing) and ‘civic entrepre-
neurs’ engaging in the development of economic clusters 
(Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013). A major advantage of a 
Triple Helix nexus is that such critical stakeholders will 
not use other, rival platforms to advocate their ideas (Jans-
sen-Jansen, 2010). There is also a major caveat, however. 
Inclusion of non-state partners raises major issues on 
scope, legitimacy and responsibility. Where state-only col-
laborations may work from a clear joint idea about overall 
ambit and purpose, Triple Helix structures often face the 
need to reconcile rather different views on both purpose 
and means of collaboration (Forsberg & Lindgren, 2015). 
As spelled out by urban regime theory, there is a danger to 
fall prey to partisan interests and narrow political aspira-
tions (Stone, 1989).
6. Operational coordination [CON]
The final coordination issue is rather specific. It concerns 
the use of contractual means of policy/project implemen-
tation complementing the joint decision-making at strate-
gic level. Such contractual means can entail the use of an 
executive body, the reliance on tenders and competitions, 
or other forms of market coordination (Buitelaar, 2003; 
Exworthy & Halford, 1999; Feiock, 2009; Janssen-Jansen, 
2010). While much literature has been devoted to network 
coordination and means of joint-decision-making, liter-
ature on intermunicipal collaboration has argued that, 
notably for the actual policy implementation and service 
provision, the use of contractual modes of coordination 
may be beneficial (Buitelaar, 2003; Hamilton, 2004). Such 
other modes may help to improve transparency, delivers 
conflict mechanisms, and enhance efficiency through a 
good separation of strategic and operational processes.
7. Policy orientation (instead of project orientation) [KOA]
Intermunicipal collaborations face a basic choice in what 
kind of collaborative ventures are pursued. They can share 
resources and partake in common projects, or they can step 
up their ambitions and develop and implement common 
policies. The expectations are that the latter yields a higher 
level of effectiveness (Boogers, 2013; Boogers et al., 2016; 
Miller & Lee, 2009). Resource pooling and joint projects 
also bring benefits, but these accrue more to the level of 
the individual municipalities than the group as a whole. 
Joint policymaking, on the other hand, makes the partners 
focus on joint benefits for the territory as a whole, calling 
on regional solidarity and a wider, more intense commit-
ment. The latter is also prompted because, while resource 
pooling and joint projects primarily require coordination 
of operational activities, policymaking covers the full span 
from policy-design to implementation. Yet, embarking on 
the full span also comes with a downside. Joint policymak-
ing considerably raises the efforts and costs of policy coor-
dination within the respective municipal administrations. 
From a pure utilitarian perspective, the need for collab-
oration may be felt more directly in the case of resource 
pooling and joint projects than for joint policymaking. 
Starting with less ambition is thus often presented as a 
way to achieve results more easily and quickly. A problem, 
however, is that the results, because of the limited collab-
oration, may not meet the problems at hand. Especially 
when there is a sense of urgency about certain spatial-envi-
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ronment issues (congestion, housing shortage, detrimental 
competition between business locations, pollution, etc), a 
more ambitious approach is likely to be more effective.
8. Issue focus [FOC]
Another choice collaborating municipalities have to 
make entails the scope and breadth of policy fields 
addressed. Do collaborations focus on selected policy 
fields or do they collaborate across the board? Both 
options show pros and cons. A prevailing idea is that 
issue focus may raise the chance that collaborations will 
work effectively (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2013; Hes & Van 
Sabee, 2015). In general, issue focus can anchor itself 
more easily in a perception of need and sense of urgency. 
It also makes it easier to set up coordination and legal 
arrangements and bring relevant actors together, some-
times even in different spatial configurations (Keating, 
1998). A disadvantage of (too much) focus, however, is 
that it inhibits coordination and alignment between sec-
toral policies. Spatial-environmental challenges faced 
by municipalities often warrant cross-sectoral, even 
integral approaches. Pursuing collective goals may thus 
benefit from collaborating in multiple fields. More gen-
erally, integral approaches are often based on synthetic 
visions of major regional challenges and directions. If 
such a vision is well-crafted, and well-supported and 
conveyed by all stakeholders, it can make a broader 
approach highly effective (Van den Berg et al., 2002). If 
a vision merely presents a paper tiger, the effect may be 
the reverse. The role of the issue spectrum, accordingly, 
is strongly dependent on contextual factors and the kind 
of collaboration pursued.
9. Mission orientation [MIS]
A related issue is the kind of objectives pursued by collab-
oration: is the collaboration explicitly aiming at collective 
strategic aims and missions, generally driven by a sense of 
urgency, or does it pursue more tactical-operational objec-
tives to create mutual benefits? This condition can work 
two-ways. On the hand one, strategic orientation gener-
ally requires more in terms of commitment, policy design, 
support, and implementation, and are thus more prone to 
resistance and failure. According to Boogers (2016), inter-
municipal collaborations that mainly aim at strategic aims 
run the risk of building insufficient capacities for effective 
collaboration, in comparison with collaborations formu-
lating primarily tactical or operational objectives. Strate-
gic forms of collaboration usually are more entrusted with 
political choices and policies resulting in a more difficult 
and often ineffective decision-making process. On the 
other hand, strategic goals may call upon shared drives, 
a commons sense of urgency and direction, and visionary 
leadership. This may set a collaboration on a roller-coaster 
of appealing and motivating visioning and strategy-mak-
ing, joint commitment and resourcing, strong networking 
and positive results which can be attributed to joint stra-
tegic orientation. While strategy-making is more demand-
ing, it may also be more rewarding.
10 Inclusive decision-making process [DMP]
Balance of power plays an important role in the shaping 
of collaboration and its effectiveness. So, the question is 
whether intermunicipal collaborations become more effec-
tive when all partners participate in the decision-making 
process, something which is expected in the literature 
(Boogers, 2013). The basic idea is that inclusive decision 
making underpins a more equal power position of partners, 
better possibilities to distribute costs and benefits, more 
mutual trust and stronger overall commitment. A problem 
may be, however, that inclusion of more parties reduces 
overall governance and strategic capacities. In certain 
context, it can be more effective to confine decision-mak-
ing to a small number of core players, like the larger, most 
competent and resourced municipalities. Where fitting, 
the latter can be part of a Triple Helix umbrella structure. 
This condition, indeed, can be expected to mirror, to some 
extent, the scores on Triple Helix.
Methods and data
Data was collected through surveys sent to municipal staff 
and regional stakeholders with key positions for all col-
laborations recorded by the Netherlands Association of 
Municipalities, VNG. Of 530 surveys sent, 143 were fully 
completed. This covered 58 of 72 known collaborations. To 
enable triangulation, only those collaborations with mul-
tiple responses have been included in the analysis, result-
ing in 37 cases. Data has also been checked through availa-
ble documents and websites, and follow-up inquiries with 
local experts accessed through the internship organisation 
(referred to as ‘field knowledge’).
Following a ‘mutual gain’ (payoff) logic, effectiveness 
was measured in terms of perceived costs and benefits. 
As explained above, costs were divided into information, 
coordination, negotiation, compliance and representation 
costs and benefits into strategic, tactical, operational and 
economic benefits.
The municipal staff and regional stakeholders con-
tacted were asked to assess effectiveness in three ways (all 
on a 1–10 scale), namely through
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1 = > 6 yrs 1 = > 14 1 > 0.55 1 = policy 1 = yes 1 = yes 1 = inclus. 1 = yes
31 Servicecentrum Drechtsteden, 32 SSNT 
(Twente)
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
30 ABG-municipalities (Gilze-Rijen) 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
17 Regio Hart van Brabant, 18 Parkstad 
Limburg
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
33 Ommen-Hardenberg, 34 HLTsamen  
(Hillegom, Lisse en Teylingen), 35 SED  
(Stede Broec, Enkhuizen en Drechterland)
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
20 Dienst Dommelvallei (1), 21 Servicecentr.
um MER (Echt-Susteren) (1), 36 Shared service 
Centrum ONS (Zwolle-Kampen) (0)
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 C
22 Limburg Economic Development 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
14 BUCH (Bergen, Uitgeest, Castricum, Heiloo), 
15 Werkorganisatie CGM (Cuijk, Grave, Mill/ 
St. Hubert), 16 Noaberkracht (Dinkelland & 
Tubbergen)
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
13 Keyport 2020 (Roermond) 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
23 AgriFood Capital (O-Brabant/ N-Limburg) 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
19 Regio Zwolle 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
24 Holland Rijnland, 26 Regio Alkmaar 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
09 DOWR (Deventer, Olst-Wijhe en Raalte) 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
27 Regio Twente, 29 GR Drechtsteden 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
07 Cleantech Regio (Apeldoorn-Deventer- 
Zutphen), 08 Midpoint Brabant (Tilburg)
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
10 Regio FoodValley 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
25 A2-municipalities 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
28 Alblasserwaard-Vijfheerenlanden 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
11 Greenport Venlo, 12 Regio Achterhoek 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
03 Metropoolregio Amsterdam 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
06 Metropoolregio Eindhoven 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
05 REWIN (West-Brabant/ Breda) 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
04 Ontwikkelingsbedrijf N.-Holland Noord 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
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1. scores per cost category (information, coordination, 
negotiation, compliance and representation) and ben-
efits (strategic, tactical, operational and economic); 
a balance score CAT is calculated by subtracting the 
average of all costs from the average of all benefits.
2. scores of overall total costs and total benefits, yielding 
the balance score ‘TOT’ and
3. grading of overall effectiveness (MARK),
The scores per region have been calculated by averaging 
the scores for CAT, TOT and MARK over all respondents, 
yielding aCAT, aTOT and aMARK. Then, through various 
rounds of expert consultation, positive effectiveness has 
been defined as the cases with
– aCAT or aTOT showing one positive and one at least 
neutral score, or
– with one positive and one negative and aMARK scoring 
6 or higher,
– or aCAT and aTOT scoring both slightly negative 
(between 0 and –1), but aMARK showing 8 or higher. 
Cases with lower scores are considered to be non-ef-
fective.
Absolute grading scores turned out as follows. On a scale 
from 1 to 10, cost items scored between 5,3 and 6,2, with 
an average of 6; total costs score 5,8. Benefit items scored 
between 5,8 and 6,2, while total benefits scored somewhat 
higher at 6,5. Overall effectiveness was valued at 6,1. Using 
the effectiveness formula, 22 collaborations appeared 
effective, and 15 appear less effective at pre-screening.
Turning to the conditions, seven out of ten were meas-
ured as binary variables to create a crisp set, in the sense 
that the attribute either exists or not: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 
(see above). For the other three conditions, cut-off values 
have been determined, on the basis of expert consultation 
and further calibration. The latter means that cut-off points, 
with a range deemed reasonable by the experts, have been 
set at such a value that similar configurations yield equal 
outcomes. For the time factor (1), collaborations with more 
than six years (before 2011) are considered to have a ‘long 
history’; a larger collaboration (2) is considered one with 
15 or more partners. Homogeneity (3) is based on a scoring 
scale running from 0 to 1, with a cut-off point at 0.55.
Subsequently, all scores have been combined in a truth 
table. A truth table contains all combinations of conditions 
present in the dataset plus the outcome (1, 0 or contradic-
tory). Applying QCA rules (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009), this 
table has been modified in two ways, to address the pres-
ence of some configurations with conflicting outcomes 
(all equal condition values with contrasting outcomes). 
Two conflicts were solved by changing the cut-off points 
for time and homogeneity. A third conflict was solved by 
removing what was considered an ‘odd’ result, namely 
the positive score of 8KTD (a contracting of the names of 
the two constituting municipalities of Achtkarspelen and 
Tytsjerksteradiel).
The final set, accordingly, measured 11 columns (10 
conditions plus one outcome) by 36 cases (See appendix). 
These cases are combined in the truth table (Table 2).
The analysis was carried out following crisp set QCA 
(csQCA), with binary scores for conditions and outcome 
(present/absent). The use of the crisp set approach, rather 
than the more complicated fuzzy set, has been deliberate. 
A crisp set provides a straightforward and parsimonious 
analysis of which configurations contribute to the outcome 
or its absence, given the collaborations’ aim to yield an 
overall benefit for the partners involved. Moreover, as 
nearly all the original data used in this study were binary 
in nature, and those which were not appeared to perform 
well with single cut-off points, a crisp analysis permits a 
straightforward presentations of the findings through an 
easily interpretable truth table (Kraus et al., 2018; Marx et 
al., 2013). Separate analyses took place for effective and 
less-effective outcomes, using the intermediate solutions 
(including logical remainders excluding contradictory 
cases from the logical minimization process).
As QCA is best applied to sets containing not too 
many conditions, the original dataset was scrutinized if 
the number of conditions could be reduced. A first ‘visual’ 
and somewhat crude inspection learned that the condition 
Operational Coordination (CON) only applied to two cases 
where the intermunicipal collaboration is organised in 
the form of Economic Boards. Strategic decision-making 
takes place here through Triple Helix umbrella organisa-
tions, and policy implementation, with a focus on eco-
nomic branding, business support and networking, takes 
places via a separate agency (the executive of the EBs) and 
market contracts. Decision-making, moreover, is in the 
hands of group of core partners. This in line with theoret-
ical insights that effective collaboration is supported by 
autonomous institutions and the use of private agencies 
and strong leaders. From a QCA perspective, this configu-
ration proved relatively marginal since only two cases are 
part of this configuration; to test the strength of the condi-
tion ‘non-network coordination’ would warrant the explo-
ration of more intermunicipal ‘Economic Board’ cases. 
Field knowledge, as well as a quick web scan, revealed 
that cooperation-based Economic Boards were mush-
rooming across the country, presenting a newly emerging, 
post-WGR collaboration type. It was decided to leave out 
this type from the QCA analysis, effectively also removing 
the CON-condition. A first inventory further revealed that 
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the Triple Helix and WGR-formalisation conditions also 
were not really prominent and discriminatory, resulting 
in the removal of two further conditions. This removal 
meets theoretical expectations. As explained above, WGR 
has lost its historically prominent role, due to the rise of 
alternatives. In the data (Appendix), Triple Helix indeed 
mirrors inclusiveness (DMP). This all resulted in a dataset 
of 34 cases and 7 conditions and a truth-table with 22 con-
figurations (Table 2), meeting the criteria of cases-condi-
tion relation as set by Marx et. al. (2013).
Findings
The analysis has been carried out using Tosmana, a QCA 
software, followed by an extensive exploration and discus-
sion of possible configurations. Based on empirical knowl-
edge, the third outcome of the analysis for the effective 
and the first for the ineffective outcomes proved the most 
sensible, in which the configurations give rise to eight 
types of collaboration, four explaining effective outcomes 
and four explaining less-effective outcomes, as shown in 
Table 3. The analysis makes a distinction between core 
‘conditions’, defining the configuration, and ‘peripheral’ 
conditions, which additionally characterise the config-
uration. Table 3 also lists raw coverage (RC, share in the 
outcome of all cases covered by the type), unique coverage 
(same share restricted to cases only appearing in one type) 
and consistency (share of cases in the type-set with the 
corresponding outcome)
Types of effective collaboration
Focus and maturity (Type A: YOF[1]+FOC[1])
A prevalent configuration for effective intermunicipal col-
laboration is the co-occurrence of a long history and issue 
focus. This sizeable type of eight collaborations (RC=0.42) 
manifest a policy- and mission-orientation, with only one 
exception, DOWR, which is more service oriented. Overall, 
this strong type confirms initial theoretical expectations 
regarding effective collaborations: maturity, issue focus 
and (for most) mission.
Metropolitan (Type B: YOF[1]+NOP[1])
The second configuration explains effectiveness through 
the compound condition of a large number of partners and 
absence of issue focus. The set comprises the two unique 
cases of the Metropolitan Areas of Amsterdam and Eind-
hoven, which differ from Type A in adopting broad rather 
than focused issue focus. These two major urban areas, with 
their heterogenous composition and massive resource base, 
manage to effectively collaborate in a broad range of policy 
domains and issues. A general finding to report here is that 
of all the larger collaborations only one appears less-effec-
tive, namely AgriFood Capital, which presents a special case 
further explained below (H). Size thus appears an almost 
sufficient condition for gaining effectiveness, contracting 
the notion that it is easier for smaller collaborations to gain 
effectiveness. Field knowledge indicates that size supports 
effective decision-making because there is less risk that col-
laborations are hijacked by minority positions.
Policy coherence (Type C: YOF[0]+HOM[1]+KOA[1])
Effective collaboration is also the hallmark of two groups 
of younger partners, manifesting policy orientation and 
inclusive decision-making. Type C includes four collabo-
rations, Keyport 2020, BUCH, Werkorganisatie CGM and 
Noaberkracht, which all have established effective struc-
tures to work together in delineated policy fields. Field 
knowledge reveals that for the last three cases, this is 
based on a dedication to joint service provision enabled 
by what is described as an ‘administrative fusion’ between 
municipal processes. Keyport 2020 has a stronger focus 
on economic strategy-making. The four cases manifest a 
small number of partners (between 2 and 6), which, sus-
tained by group homogeneity, facilitate prompt results. 
Moreover, they are located in non-core areas of the Neth-
erlands, all suffering some kind of demographic problem 
(out-migration of young, highly skilled population or even 
shrinkage), spurring them, according to field knowledge, 
to develop collective strength. More generally, policy ori-
entation manifests itself as a nearly necessary conditions 
for effectiveness (A-D, with one deviant case in A).
Inclusive-strategy (Type D: YOF[0] +MIS[1]+DMP[1])
The final effective group of young collaborations stands 
out by mission-orientation and inclusive decision making, 
supported by a policy orientation. This type involves four 
cases, all manifesting a certain specialisation in man-
ufacturing in locations outside of the Randstad, which 
informs and motivates joint agenda-setting and policy-
making. Inclusive decision-making in this group is based 
on engagement with wider societal and business circles, 
which will contribute to support and effectiveness. A 
special case here is Regio Zwolle. While younger and with 
issue focus, Zwolle performs similar to Eindhoven and 
thus approaches Type B. Our field knowledge indicates 
that Zwolle’s inclusive decision-making roots the collabo-
rations strongly and effectively in the wider regional com-
munity, including networks of entrepreneurs.
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Table 3: Solution table for configuration of conditions for effective and ineffective collaborations
Collaboration Type (outcome = 1, effective)
Condition A Focus and  
maturity*
B Metropolitan C Policy  
coherence
D Inclusive strategy
Age (YOF) ● ● ⊗ ⊗
Number of partners (NOP) – ● ⊗ –
Group homogeneity (HOM) – ⊗ ● –
Policy orientation (vs projects) (KOA) ● ● ● ●
Issue spectrum (FOC) ● ⊗ – –
Mission orientation (MIS) ● – – ●
Inclusive decision-making (DMP) – ⊗ ● ●
Consistency 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Raw coverage (RC) 0.42 0.11 0.21 0.21
Unique coverage (UC) 0.42 0.11 0.16 0.16
Cases (unique in italic) 4, 5, 7, 8, 9,  10, 11, 12 3, 6 13, 14, 15, 16 13, 17, 18, 19
Overall solution consistency                          1.00
Overall solution coverage                         0.89 (17/19)
*one case (out of eight) does not meet the two ‘peripheral’ conditions KOA and MIS (9, DOWR)





G Missing  
orientation
H Lacking  
executive
Age (YOF) ⊗ ● ⊗ ⊗
Number of partners (NOP) ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ –
Group homogeneity (HOM) – – ⊗ –
Policy orientation (vs projects) (KOA) ⊗ – – –
Issue spectrum (FOC) – ⊗ – ●
Mission orientation (MIS) – – ⊗ ●
Inclusive decision-making (DMP) – ⊗ ● ⊗
Consistency 0.78 1.00 1.00 1.00
Raw coverage (RC) 0.47 0.40 0.20 0.13
Unique coverage (UC) 0.33 0.33 0.07 0.07
Cases (unique in italic) 20, 21, 22, 31,  32, 33, 34, 35, 36
24, 25, 26,  
27, 28, 29 30, 31, 32 22, 23
Overall solution consistency                                                                   0.88
Overall solution coverage                                                             0.93 (14/15)
Note: Black circles (“●”) indicate the presence of a condition, and open circles (“⊗”) indicate its absence. A hyphen (“–”) a condition 
that is not relevant to that particular configuration in regard to the outcome (it is both present and absent in the set). Large circles suggest 
(set-defining) ‘core’ conditions, while small circles indicate (emerging) ‘peripheral’ conditions.
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Types of less-effective collaboration
Policy vacuum (Configurations E: YOF[0]+KOA[0])
The first type entails nine young and project-oriented col-
laborations. Overall, this type, all of smaller size [NOP=0] 
shows that that a mere engagement in joined projects may 
prove rather difficult for starting collaborations. There are 
two exceptions here, MER and Dommelvallei, showing 
that a practical service-orientation can work effectively 
(lowering the consistency of this type).
Missing focus (Type F: YOF[1]+NOP[0]+FOC[0])
This type sustains less effectiveness through the combina-
tion of age, smaller size with no issue focus, encompass-
ing six collaborations. This configuration corroborates 
earlier insight that, overall, smaller collaborations need 
to compensate for lacking issue focus for instance for 
manifesting homogeneity (cf. C). However, although three 
cases do have a policy orientation, and five even manifest 
a mission-orientation, this does not seem to compensate 
the negative impact of a lack of issue focus in the early 
days of the cooperation.
Missing orientation (Type G: YOF[0] +HOM[0]+MIS[0])
This type encompasses younger, heterogeneous collabo-
rations with a shared service provision (also described as 
‘administrative fusions’), which all happen to be small. 
The data suggests that less effectiveness stems from a lack 
of homogeneity and of mission. There is only one unique 
case in this type, ABG-municipalities (Gilze-Rijen), which, 
if it developed a mission would match the characteristics 
of effective type ‘inclusive strategy’ (D). Mission develop-
ment thus appears the main challenge here.
Lacking executive (Type H: YOF[0] +DMP[0])
The final type of less-effective collaboration consists of 
two recent collaborations, Limburg Economic Develop-
ment and AgriFood Capital. The latter presents the only 
unique case. Less effectiveness can be attributed here to 
one condition, namely absence of inclusive decision-mak-
ing. Unlike the previous type, however, this does not 
present a lack to overcome. Like the upcoming category 
of Economic Board regions (separated out), these collabo-
rations pursue a joint, focused, mission-driven economic 
agenda organised as a separate stream of activity. What 
these collaborations have not done, however, is handing 
over decision-making to an Executive Board. This appar-
ently hampers effectiveness, in line with theoretical 
insights concerning the benefits from separating strategic 
decision-making and operational affairs.
Conclusion
Regional or intermunicipal collaboration plays an impor-
tant role in local government and policy-implementation 
in the Netherlands, but also shows quite mixed results. 
What explains this variability? Using a large sample of 
registered initiatives in the Netherlands, this study has 
explored conditions for more or less effective collabora-
Table 4: summary evaluations of conditions
# Ab. Condition Summary (co)contribution
1 YOF Age Enables effectiveness in bigger (set B) and focused cases (A); hampers effectiveness without 
such focus (F)
2 NOP Number of partners Almost sufficient (7 out of 8 effective): playing a distinctive role in explaining the effective-
ness of Eindhoven and Amsterdam (B vs F)
3 HOM Group homogeneity Contributes to effectiveness in most cases manifesting policy orientation (C) 
4 WGR WGR formalisation Not included in the final QCA-analysis, because of limited presence in the first assessment: 
lost its central role
5 TH Triple Helix Not included in the final QCA-analysis, because of limited presence in the first assessment: 
largely mirrors DMP
6 CON Operational coordination Not included in the final QCA-analysis, because this condition was only present in the 
particular subgroup of collaborations using an Economic Board, that was excluded from the 
QCA-analysis
7 KOA Policy orientation Nearly a necessary condition of effectiveness (A-D); project orientation appears insufficient 
for starting collaborations (E)
8 FOC Policy focus Supports effectiveness for all mature collaborations (A vs F)
9 MIS Mission orientation Notably favourable for younger, inclusive collaborations (D vs G)
10 DMP Inclusive decision-making Supports younger collaborations notably in combination with mission (D) or policy orientation 
(cf. C); while absence is detrimental for younger collaborations (H) 
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tion. Conditions are not considered prime causes here. 
Collaborations present complex processes, reliant on 
a high level of self-organisation, in which conditions 
operate contingently and relationally. There are, in such 
a view, no immediate ‘causes’ of success other than the 
strenuous work of the agents and institutions involved. 
So, the question is not what defines success or failure, 
but whether, amongst all the unique cases explored, 
one can detect certain commonalities and patterns. This 
then amounts to a genuine geographical understanding 
of the phenomenon of collaboration, which sees causal-
ity in substantive terms – probing the causes of effects in 
cases – rather-than in probabilistic terms – predicting the 
effects of causes (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012; see also see 
also Rutten, 2019). Such an approach, we would argue, is 
suitable for all geographical phenomena marked by high 
levels of internal agency and self-organisation (urban/
regional development, innovation, policy), for which too 
often inappropriate probabilistic-universal methods are 
applied through regression and econometrical analysis.
Following such a pattern-seeking, qualitative 
approach, this study has employed a crisp-set configura-
tional analysis (QCA). Results come in the form of collab-
oration types, that is, configurations of condition explain-
ing effectiveness and less-effectiveness. Not unexpectedly, 
quite a number of types emerged, four matching effective-
ness and four less effectiveness, manifesting a number of 
patterns. The most prominent pattern here is that effec-
tiveness takes time, provided with time comes focus (type 
A versus F). Another prominent pattern is how effective-
ness requires policy orientation (as a near- necessary con-
dition for A-D), while project orientation appears clearly 
detrimental for young collaborations (E), although these 
findings do not come with full consistency. So, the core 
pattern emerging is that policy and mission orientation are 
beneficial for young collaborations (C, D, versus E), which, 
when collaborations mature, warrant further issue focus 
(A vs F). This pattern covers 30 of our 34 cases. Corrobo-
rated by their low unique coverages, the other types man-
ifest some additional patterns. Type B’s unique cases, the 
Metropolitan areas of Amsterdam and Eindhoven, reflect 
the capacity of these two major urban areas to be effective 
without focus. Types G and H each cover the one unique 
less-effective case, namely ABG-municipalities (Gilze-Ri-
jen) (G) and Agrifood Capital (H). This lesser performance 
can be attributed to mission-orientation and inclusiveness 
respectively. In sum, we find one dominant evolutionary 
pattern (evolving policy focus), one minor pattern (met-
ropolitan) and the specific characteristics of two unique 
cases.
What do these patterns mean in the context of the 
conditions listed in Table 1? First it should be said that 
such an assessment does not entail a theoretical (dis)
confirmation or qualification. The only thing we can do 
is reflecting upon the role of conditions as transpiring 
from our cases. As summarized above, our synthesis is 
relational-configurational (see also Table 4). While some 
conditions manifest more prominence, such as policy ori-
entation for all, and issue focus for older effective collab-
orations, all these results remain contextual. Neverthe-
less, a clear match can be found regarding the emphasis 
of collective action theory on political and institutional 
aspects, notably focus, mass for cost-benefit distribution, 
and formalisation (albeit not through the WGR). Perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, size proves to play a rather posi-
tive, supporting role of capacity-building. The regime per-
spective sheds light, in particular, on the mushrooming 
of economically oriented cooperations (partly set apart 
in our analysis). Both along more formal and informal 
lines (inclusive decision-making yet focused and mis-
sion-driven), these collaborations show how business 
interests and economic positioning infuse cooperation. 
After our data collection, we have witnessed how many 
more regions established Economic Boards. While these 
may quickly gain effectiveness, this development also 
raises concern. In times when inclusiveness and com-
prehensive spatial approaches are so important, one can 
question the desirability and even legitimacy of such ‘neo-
liberal’ ventures (Harvey, 1989). What seems to weigh less, 
as far as accounted for (Table 1), are ‘softer’ socio-cultural 
and collaborative aspects. The overall impression is that 
bonding, trust and solidarity are complementary aspects, 
which assist in sustaining more virtuous or vicious cycles. 
Our study thus clearly bears out the instrumental nature 
of intermunicipal collaborations.
In conclusion, we are convinced that the approach 
applied here presents a promising way to study these 
kinds of contextual and relational spatial phenomena. 
By focusing on combinations of conditions, as ‘causes 
of effects in cases’, QCA has allowed to discover a set of 
patterns (major and minor) and unique case positions 
fitting the complexity and variability of the phenomenon 
of intermunicipal collaboration. This also brings home 
the message that success and failure do not come from 
one-size-fits-all solutions or general best-practices. Policy 
insights stem from contextual knowledge of the combined 
roles and paths of enabling conditions in view of the par-
ticular trajectory of collaboration.
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1=>6 yrs 1=>14 1=0.55+ 1=yes 1=yes 1=contr. 1=policy 1=yes 1=yes 1=inclus. 1=yes
01 The Economic Board 
(Arnhem-Nijmegen)
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
02 U10 Economic Board 
(Utrecht)
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
03 Metropoolregio 
Amsterdam
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
04 Ontwikkelingsbedrijf 
N.-Holland Noord
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
05 REWIN (West-Brabant/ 
Breda)
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
06 Metropoolregio 
Eindhoven
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
07 Cleantech Regio 
(Apeldoorn-Deventer-
Zutphen)
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
08 Midpoint Brabant 
(Tilburg)
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
09 DOWR (Deventer,  
Olst-Wijhe en Raalte)
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
10 Regio FoodValley 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
11 Greenport Venlo 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
12 Regio Achterhoek 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
13 Keyport 2020 
(Roermond)
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
14 BUCH (Bergen, Uitgeest, 
Castricum, Heiloo)
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
15 Werkorganisatie CGM 
(Cuijk, Grave, Mill/ St. 
Hubert)
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
16 Noaberkracht  
(Dinkelland & Tubbergen)
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
17 Regio Hart van Brabant 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1































1=>6 yrs 1=>14 1=0.55+ 1=yes 1=yes 1=contr. 1=policy 1=yes 1=yes 1=inclus. 1=yes
18 Parkstad Limburg 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
19 Regio Zwolle 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
20 Dienst Dommelvallei 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
21 Servicecentrum MER 
(Echt-Susteren)
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
22 Limburg Economic 
Development
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
23 AgriFood Capital 
(O-Brabant/ N-Limburg)
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
24 Holland Rijnland 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
25 A2-municipalities 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
26 Regio Alkmaar 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
27 Regio Twente 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
28 Alblasserwaard-
Vijfheerenlanden
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
29 GR Drechtsteden 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
30 ABG-municipalities 
(Gilze-Rijen)
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
31 Service centrum 
Drechtsteden
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
32 SSNT (Twente) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
33 Ommen-Hardenberg 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
34 HLTsamen (Hillegom, 
Lisse en Teylingen)
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
35 SED (Stede Broec, 
Enkhuizen en Drechterland)
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
36 Shared service Centrum 
ONS (Zwolle-Kampen)
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
